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Articles
The Second Circuit’s Curious Journey
Through the Law of Tippee Liability
for Insider Trading: Newman to
Martoma
Andrew Carl Spacone*
INTRODUCTION

Federal securities regulation presents a daunting challenge for
those who are touched by it. The governing principles are myriad,
complex, and can be ambiguous; the civil and criminal penalties for
violations can be severe. Even where well intentioned, federal
securities law can sweep broadly to ensnare even those who engage
in legitimate practices. Insider trading law is one aspect of federal
securities regulation that amply illustrates this point. The critical
stakeholders in this area of the law are the federal government—in
particular the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Department of Justice (DOJ)—and, on the receiving end of the
law for purposes of this Article, the securities industry.
This Article focuses on one form of insider trading law: “tippee”
liability, which imposes liability on recipients of material nonpublic information (MNPI) who purchase or sell securities while in
possession of such information.1 This area of insider trading law is
* Professor Spacone is the Assistant Visiting Professor of Business Law,
Roger Williams University School of Law. His legal experience includes
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confusing and can lead to uncertain and often ambiguous outcomes.
This is amply demonstrated by the current state of tippee liability
law in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
This Article will center on two recent important cases for the
government and the securities industry: United States v. Newman,2
and United States v. Martoma (the Martoma cases).3
These cases dealt with the personal benefit rule as a
prerequisite for tippee liability in the “gift-giving” context involving
“friends.”4 In a matter of three years, these cases, which involved
similar fact patterns, reached divergent outcomes while relying
largely on the same U.S. Supreme Court precedent to justify their
core propositions.5 There is nothing particularly unusual about
panels interpreting precedent differently—even panels in the same
circuit. The Second Circuit’s struggles over where to draw the line
between legal and illegal trading of MNPI within the framework of
controlling Supreme Court precedent and its own contemporary
case law, however, are particularly noteworthy.
The objectives of this Article are modest. First, this Article will
present and discuss the cases in such a way that the reader—
especially law students—can get a good sense of how courts, even
one as admired as the Second Circuit, can sometimes struggle when
faced with ambiguous fact patterns and unclear statutory guidance.
These cases are complex and intricate. Boiling them down to their
essential components runs the inevitable risk of not doing them
outside practice with two major law firms, and thirty years inside practice with
a Fortune 300 company, Textron Inc., which he retired from as Deputy General
Counsel & Assistant Secretary and head of the litigation group. Professor
Spacone would like to acknowledge the invaluable comments and observations
provided by Gregory Morvillo, Esq., a partner with Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe, many of which have been incorporated into this Article, and the
significant editorial assistance provided by Carla Centanni, Roger Williams
University School of Law Class of 2020, and member of the Roger Williams
University Law Review. Any errors or omissions in this Article, however, are
entirely to the account of Professor Spacone.
1. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
2. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137
S. Ct. 420 (2016).
3. United States v. Martoma (Martoma I), 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017),
amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Martoma (Martoma
II), 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017).
4. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 67–68; Newman, 773 F.3d at 444.
5. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 73–76 (applying Dirks, 463 U.S. 646);
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (applying Dirks, 463 U.S. 646).
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justice. Hopefully sufficient information has been provided to offer
insight into how and why the court grappled with the issue without
detracting too much from, or obscuring, the doctrinal analysis.
Central to the Second Circuit’s tribulations is the fact that
there are no clear statutory guidelines as to what constitutes
insider trading nor specific statutory language concerning how far
the government should go with its enforcement powers.6 Congress
has not spoken to these issues and the general language of section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)
and its implementing regulation, SEC Rule 10b-5, do not provide a
clear standard as to what activities constitute fraud or who the
targets for such an inquiry should be.7 As one commentator aptly
put it, it is up to the courts to determine the boundaries of insider
trading by “bootstrap[ping] an interpretation of the law of insider
trading up from other general legal concepts, particularly
fraud
as it appears in many different legal contexts.”8 Inherently, this
“allows” courts in the insider trading context to reach different
results in cases involving essentially the same fact patterns, which
occurred in the Second Circuit. Put another way, defining tippee
insider trading brings to mind Justice Potter Stewart’s famous
quote concerning obscenity: “I shall not today attempt further to
define [obscenity] . . . [b]ut I know it when I see it . . . .”9 Of course,
6. Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider
Trading, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 126 (1993). Congress has never defined
insider trading. However, in 2015, Senators Jack Reed (D) and Robert
Menendez (D) introduced the “Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act.” S. 702, 114th
Cong. (2015). The bill appears to have been in response to the narrowing of
the evidence necessary to prove tippee liability in Newman. For a discussion
of Newman, see infra section I.C. and II.A. Under the bill, it was irrelevant
whether a trader knew the source of the required fiduciary duty or whether
the source derived any personal benefit from tipping insider information. See
S. 702; see generally Reed & Menendez Introduce Bill to Clearly Define and Ban
Unlawful Insider Trading, JACK REED: U.S. SENATOR FOR R.I. (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://www.reed.senate.gov/news/releases/reed-and-menendez-introduce-billto-clearly-define-and-ban-unlawful-insider-trading [https://perma.cc/MY8GD7N6]. The bill goes well beyond where the Second Circuit ended up in the
Martoma cases. However, the bill did not gain any traction in Congress, and
based on the Martoma cases, it is unlikely to pick up any steam. Further, the
bill is poorly crafted and would create more problems for potential defendants
than it ostensibly cures, but this is a subject for another time.
7. See Scheppele, supra note 6, at 124.
8. Id.
9. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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the Supreme Court “defined” obscenity, albeit with a subjective
standard, but like the Second Circuit’s efforts to define tippee
insider trading, struggled to get there.10
Second, this Article will discuss how the two Second Circuit
panels approached the issue of tippee liability as a means of better
understanding the outcomes and providing a basis for the
implications for future tippee liability cases in the Circuit. The
conclusion that this article reaches is hardly earth shattering: the
Newman court and the dissents in the Martoma cases took a narrow
view of the personal benefit rule in the gift-giving context.11 On the
other hand, the majority in the Martoma cases approached tippee
insider trading liability broadly.12 Put simply, the former approach
led to a favorable rule for the securities industry; the latter a highly
favorable rule for the government. In the final analysis, it is no
more complicated than this. How the panels reached their ultimate
conclusions lay at the heart of this Article.
This Article will not analyze which case was doctrinally correct.
Frankly, the answer of who got it “right” is best left to others, and
neither case is entirely satisfying from a doctrinal perspective.
Moreover, this Article is not a brief in support of open borders on
insider trading.
Also, this Article will not pass judgment on the government’s
position on tippee liability other than to state that its approach as
reflected in these cases is consistent with its general view that
federal securities law should be interpreted broadly to protect
investors.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Introduction to Insider Trading
Insider trading involves the purchase or sale of a security for
personal gain on the basis of awareness, while in possession of
MNPI concerning the issuer of the security in breach of a duty of
confidentiality and trust owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively to
the issuer of the security (e.g., a corporation), the shareholders of
10. See Scheppele, supra note 6, at 123–24.
11. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2017) (Pooler, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014),
abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
12. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 73–74.
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the issuer, or any other person who is the source of the MNPI.13
The personal gain may be either a profit or avoidance of a loss.14
Holding a security while in possession of MNPI is not insider
trading.15 The heart of insider trading is the breach of a duty of
confidentiality with respect to the MNPI. This area presents the
most complex interpretive issues.16
Insider trading is unfair because the person in possession of
the MNPI has a significant trading advantage over other persons
who do not have the information.17 As will be discussed more fully
below, the mere possession of MNPI as a basis for trading does not
necessarily constitute fraud.18 Indeed, the central issue in
Newman and the Martoma cases was where to draw the line
between legal and illegal use of MNPI by recipients of the
information in the context of the securities industry, which thrives
on asymmetry of information.19 Simply put, insider trading is
illegal. However, not all sharing of, and trading on, MNPI by
recipients of the information is insider trading.20
A person in possession of MNPI has a duty of confidentiality
with respect to that information and has two options to avoid
prosecution for insider trading: either do not trade on the
information, or “make appropriate disclosures”—i.e., make it
sufficiently public—ahead of time.21 The critical question at the
center of Newman and the Martoma cases was when does a person
have a duty of confidentiality?
The Supreme Court has adopted three theories of insider
trading to capture “insiders.” The classical theory deals with
“actual” insiders,22 and the “misappropriation” theory deals with
13. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2000) for the SEC’s definition of insider
trading, which includes tipper-tippee liability.
14. See generally id.
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a). This section requires that insider trading
law applies only when there has been a “purchase or sale” of security. Id.
16. See id.
17. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 673 (1983) (quoting In re Cady, Roberts
& Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 912 (Nov. 8, 1961).
18. See § 240.10b5-1(b).
19. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v.
Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 450 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
20. See § 240.10b5-1(b).
21. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651.
22. Generally, when people discuss the classical view of insider trading,
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“outsiders” who misappropriate MNPI and trade on it.23 The law
is reasonably stable in these areas.
The third theory of insider trading is tippee liability.24 When
a person (tippee) purchases or sells a security for personal gain
while in possession of MNPI received directly or indirectly from an
insider (tipper) in breach of a duty of confidentiality, the tippee may
be liable for insider trading.25 The tipper also may be guilty of
insider trading irrespective of whether he or she trades on the
MNPI, but this is of secondary importance here.26 As discussed,
drawing the lines for tippee insider trading can be challenging.
It is important to understand that the term “securities” is
expansive and includes many types of securities.27 As such, insider
trading violations can involve any type of security. The cases
discussed in this article involve trading in public company common
equity shares, which dominate most insider trading cases.
Although insider trading is not limited to shares of public
companies that trade on national exchanges, such as the New York
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, almost all the cases arise in this
context. The SEC can easily access trading activity on national
exchanges. Further, the SEC is charged with the oversight,
administration, and enforcement of federal securities laws.28 The
SEC pays particular attention to “unusual” trading activity in
proximity to material corporate events such as mergers or earnings
announcements, each of which can move share price up or down. In
other words, the SEC works backwards from circumstantial
evidence.29 The detection mechanisms available to the SEC and
they point to Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (setting forth the
classical view parameters of insider trading).
23. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649–50 (1997)
(establishing the misappropriation theory of insider trading); see generally
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (originally crafting the
misappropriation theory of insider trading).
24. See Dirks, 463 U.S at 647.
25. Id. at 662.
26. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 75 (citations omitted).
27. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). This section of the United States
Code codifies the Exchange Act, which set forth the definition of what
constitutes a security. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10), the section of the
Exchange Act which contains essentially the same “list” of securities.
28. What We Do, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 10, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/RQ37-VSSJ].
29. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES AND REGULATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 942 (7th ed. 2017).
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market participants, such as national exchanges and brokerdealers, cannot catch all indicia of potential insider trading, but
they are sufficiently robust to have a meaningful deterrence effect.
Detection is an important enforcement tool because there is good
evidence that sanctions alone do not deter insider trading.30
If the SEC’s suspicions are aroused, it has broad authority
under the Exchange Act to commence an investigation into insider
trading, including issuing subpoenas and taking depositions.31 For
those who engage in suspected insider trading, phone records,
emails and statements from persons lower on the “food chain” who
are promised immunity often provide ample evidence to support
prosecution. Targets of insider trading investigations often make
their lives worse by lying to investigators or otherwise unlawfully
interfering with an investigation, thereby facilitating an
obstruction of justice charge tacked on to insider trading charges.
One would think that sophisticated investors who engage in
insider trading would be aware of the SEC’s detection prowess and
ability to ferret out damning information, especially improvident
emails, as well as the need to be honest when talking to
investigators. This does not appear to be the case for many who
engage in insider trading; or perhaps they simply suffer from the
hubris of thinking that they are too smart to be caught or that when
caught, they can outsmart the government.
Insider trading cases rarely catch the imagination of the public,
other than to reinforce the widely held view that Wall Street is
inherently venal. Recently, however, the indictment of New York
Congressman Christopher Collins (and others) for violating federal
insider trading laws piqued the public’s interest.32 Collins is the
alleged tipper, and his son and father-in-law are the alleged
tippees.33 The government claims that the two defendant tippees
sold stock in a biotechnology company while in possession of MNPI
30. Id. The authors discussed this point and offered references to an
article to support the proposition. It is a maxim of behavioral science, however,
that, for many, absent detection, the mere potential of sanctions is not
efficacious from an enforcement perspective.
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1).
32. See Alan Feuer & Shane Golmacher, New York Congressman Chris
Collins Is Charged With Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/nyregion/chris-collins-insidertrading.html [https://perma.cc/GMC5-TGPK].
33. Id.
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concerning a failed drug trial.34 Collins shared the information
with his son, who then passed it on to his future father-in-law and
others.35 The two named tippees—and several others who were not
named in the indictment—used the information to avoid over
$700,000 in losses.36 Collins was prohibited from selling his stock
because he sat on the company’s board, but this is scant consolation
under the scheme liability theory of insider trading.37 Whether the
government will prevail remains to be seen, but the Collins
indictment is a classic example of tipper-tippee liability.
B. Introduction to Newman and the Martoma Cases
Newman and the Martoma cases focused on determining the
level of evidence necessary for a fact finder to infer that the tipper
received a personal benefit as a requirement to establish the duty
of confidentiality. Newman and the dissents in the Martoma cases
advocated an objective evidentiary standard as a means to limit
overbroad application of tippee insider trading law in the context of
gift-giving to so-called “friends.”38 The majorities in the Martoma
cases opted for a subjective standard, which reflected an expansive
view of tippee liability law in this context.39 Each tethered their
opinions to the seminal case on tipper-tippee liability, Dirks v. SEC,
but as discussed, reached widely divergent outcomes.40 The
contours of tippee insider trading law in the Second Circuit are
important because a high volume of cases, including many of high
profile prosecutions, are litigated in the courts of the Southern
District of New York. As such, the Second Circuit has become a
leading appeals court, if not the leader, for insider trading law,
subject of course, to cases that make their way to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which has occurred only once in the last almost twenty

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. There were several other individuals who also used the information
but were not named in the indictment. Id.
37. Id.
38. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 80 (2d Cir. 2017) (Pooler, J., dissenting); see
also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that
an objective standard is needed to establish the personal benefit requirement),
abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
39. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 76.
40. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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years.41
Prior to Newman, the law of insider trading regarding tippee
liability in the Second Circuit had been relatively stable and highly
favorable to the government. The United States Attorney’s Office
had a long history of successful criminal prosecutions of insider
trading cases in the Circuit. Newman upset the status quo,
breaking a string of successful insider trading cases prosecuted by
the United States Attorney.42 Martoma II restored most, if not all,
of what Newman took away from the government on the personal
benefit rule.43
Trading on MNPI for personal benefit may be a violation of
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and SEC Rule 10b-5.44 In short,
these anti-fraud provisions prohibit any fraud or deceptive
practices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.45
The essence of insider trading is that it involves fraudulent conduct
and thus constitutes a violation of these provisions. As discussed,
violators face harsh civil penalties46—i.e. up to three times the
profit or loss avoided—and criminal penalties, including
incarceration for up to twenty years, not to mention the significant
costs associated with defending against government proceedings.47
They also face serious reputational risks, which can have a major
impact on their businesses and future employment prospects.
Summing up to this point, there are no clear statutory
guidelines for what constitutes insider trading. The underlying
provisions that prohibit insider trading are general, yet violations
of insider trading law can have harsh consequences including
41. Nate Raymond, NY Insider Trading Ruling Tests Prosecutors beyond
Wall Street, REUTERS: BUS. NEWS (Jan. 26, 2015, 7:05 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-insidertrading-analysis/ny-insidertrading-ruling-tests-prosecutors-beyond-wall-streetidUSKBN0KZ17W20150126 [https://perma.cc/2F6Z-B44P].
42. Ronak V. Patel & Toby M. Galloway, Tippee Insider Trading after
Newman and Salman: Why Knowledge Is Not Always Your Friend, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME COMM. NEWSL. (ABA), Jan. 2017, at 3.
43. See generally Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 75 (2d Cir. 2017).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (section 10(b) of the Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (SEC Rule 10b-5).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Both of these speak in terms of
the requisite fraud occurring in connection with the “purchase or sale of any
security.”
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1.
47. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.
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criminal penalties. It is axiomatic that the broader insider trading
law is, the more people will be subject to harsh civil and criminal
penalties, not to mention heavy costs to defend themselves if they
are named in a government proceeding. As will be discussed
presently, the unfairness of insider trading is another important
dimension that influences the development of insider trading law.
The SEC has the power to bring civil enforcement actions for
insider trading violations under section 10(b)/rule 10b-5.48 The
SEC may initiate civil proceedings in an administrative law court,
depending on the target, or in a United States federal district
court.49 Criminal prosecutions may be brought in federal district
court only by the DOJ either independently or by referral from the
SEC.50 While private suits are permitted under section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act they are uncommon for reasons beyond the scope of
this Article.51
Ultimately, the contours of insider trading law reside with the
courts. Most insider trading cases, at least the high-profile cases,
involve criminal prosecutions. This is important because in
calculating the limits of tippee liability law, one would hope that
the courts are cognizant of the consequences arising from the limits
they draw or do not draw.
The SEC, ostensibly, has considerable discretion under the
“Chevron doctrine” to enact rules to implement section 10(b).52 The
SEC has defined insider trading in rule 10b-5-1.53 The rule states
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
49. How Investigations Work, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan.
27,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/enforce/how-investigations-work.html
[https://perma.cc/6LUN-66CJ].
50. See Securities Subcommittee of the White Collar Criminal Litig. Comm.,
Criminal Prosecutorial Discretion in Insider Trading Cases: Let’s Look at the
Numbers,
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N 1
(May
12,
2010),
https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Commercial_Federal_Litigation/ComFed_Dis
play_Tabs/Reports/CRIMINALPROSECUTORIALDISCRETIONINTHEINSI
DERTRADINGCASES_pdf.html [https://perma.cc/U486-8P57].
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1.
52. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In this
landmark case, the Supreme Court sustained the Environmental Protection
Agency’s interpretation of a provision in the Clean Air Act holding in the
process that the courts should defer to executive agency interpretation of the
laws they administer provided the law is ambiguous and the interpretation
reasonable. Id. The Court traced this power to Congress’ authorization of
agency rule making. Id.
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5-1.
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that the law of insider trading is “otherwise defined by judicial
opinions,” which is the SEC’s way of saying that it has the power to
define insider trading law as well.54 Furthermore, under the
Chevron doctrine, the SEC’s position is that its interpretation of the
law should be given deference by the courts.55
Importantly, the government is afforded wide discretion to
bring insider trading enforcement proceedings and aggressively
urges its view on the courts, even those views, which the court
previously rejected. The courts do not always embrace the SEC’s
view of insider trading law, as Dirks, Newman, and other cases
reveal.56 As will be discussed below, Dirks and Newman sought to
limit the reach of insider trading law because of the serious
consequences for certain information sharing activity that merit
protection from the reach of insider trading law.
The animus behind insider trading law is that the practice is
fundamentally unfair to shareholders who do not have the
information and thus miss the opportunity to make gains or trim
losses through trading.57 This represents an asymmetry of
information between those who have the information and those who
do not. Various plausible market efficiency and transparency
arguments have been made against regulating insider trading, but,
as far as the SEC is concerned, they are not strong enough to
outweigh the fundamental unfairness of the conduct.58
The unfairness aspect of insider trading drives government
enforcement actions under section 10(b)/rule 10b-5. Insider trading
runs counter to the SEC’s mandate to protect investors and ensure
54. Id.
55. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
56. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); United States v.
Newman, 773 F.3d. 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States,
137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
57. See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668,
40 SEC Docket 907, 912 (1961). Cady, Roberts is the seminal case on the
application of section 10(b) to market trading transactions. That decision was
premised on the fundamental unfairness of insider trading and the need to
regulate it under the anti-fraud statute. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8459, 43 SEC Docket 933, 936 (Nov.
25, 1968). Fraud in an insider trading case derives from “inherent unfairness
involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.” Cady, Roberts, 40 SEC Docket
at 912.
58. See COX ET AL., supra note 29, at 906.
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the integrity and fairness of markets where they trade.59 Because
the SEC believes that insider trading undermines investor
confidence in the integrity and fairness of securities markets,
detecting and prosecuting insider trading violations is one of the
SEC’s enforcement priorities.60 To put it bluntly, the Agency hates
insider trading and its track record in prosecuting such actions is
formidable, although there has been at least one notable exception
recently in addition to Newman.61 Merely being the subject of an
insider trading investigation can cost one dearly as the professional
golfer Phil Mickelson recently found out.62
C. The Securities Industry
It is important to briefly discuss how the securities industry
obtains and uses information concerning issuers because the
industry was front and center in Newman and in the Martoma
cases.63 Indeed, the securities industry is especially susceptible to
59. What We Do, supra note 28.
60. Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/generalresources/glossary/insider-trading [https://perma.cc/3TWQ-G2BJ] (last visited
Aug. 9, 2018).
61. See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009). Yes,
this is the Mark Cuban. He prevailed at trial on the duty issue. Purportedly,
he said at a law school forum, “If you got resources, fight ‘em,” referring to the
SEC, “because they’re not that smart.” Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., What Elon
Can Learn from Mark Cuban About Fighting the SEC, WALL STREET JOURNAL:
BUSINESS WORLD (Aug. 24, 2018, 6:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/whatelon-can-learn-from-mark-cuban-about-fighting-the-sec-1535149910
[https://perma.cc/D66Q-2PHU]. We do not have time for this here, but it is
doubtful that Elon Musk is in pari delicto so to speak with Cuban but he
certainly has the funds and insurance to fight the SEC if it decides to go after
him for his infamous twit on Tesla going private.
62. Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 7–8. Michelson was named as a
so-called “relief defendant” in a criminal complaint filed against the tipper of
the MNPI and tippee. The tippee defendant passed on the confidential
information to Mickelson who traded on it. Perhaps mindful of Newman’s
knowledge requirement, the government decided not to criminally charge
Mickelson as a remote tippee. He ended up, however, disgorging the
approximately $930,000 profit he made from the trade plus interest. No doubt,
he paid his lawyers a handsome fee as well. Perhaps, he should have sought
Mark Cuban’s counsel. Although, given what was at stake, Mickelson appears
to have made the right decision.
63. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2017); Martoma I, 869 F.3d 58
(2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v.
Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States,
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insider trading violations. Market analysts, financial reporters,
traders, and investment advisors hunger for important economic
information to derive revenues or profits for their firms and on
occasion, for themselves. As such, they relentlessly employ a
variety of methods and tools not available to most of the general
investing public to ascertain and analyze information that they can
pass on to their investor clients for potential trading purposes.
Often, securities professionals, especially market analysis, make
provident trading decisions for their firms, as is the case with
traders. Often market analysts will have direct communications
with insiders, such as investor relations personnel, to further their
information gathering, albeit ostensibly in compliance with the
federal securities laws. Further, market analysts and traders often
share information, especially when they work for the same
brokerage firm.
At the risk of simplification, the foregoing discussion can be
summarized as such: the securities industry thrives on important
economic information concerning issuers, and the sooner it can get
the information and the more reliable the information, the better.
This is a powerful motivating force that can lead to insider trading.
There is nothing inherently illegal concerning market
professionals’ search for information, or the selective use of that
information for their clients or firms. As the Supreme Court stated,
“[i]t is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the
markets themselves, that such information cannot be
simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or
the public generally.”64 Again, it is not necessarily illegal for an
investor or securities professional to obtain critical economic
information concerning a corporation. Moreover, in such
circumstances, an insider might disclose MNPI that ends up in an
investor’s hand inadvertently or without the intent that it be a
“gift.”65
The SEC acknowledges and encourages the flow of important
economic information from market analysts to investors because it
is important to the latter’s investment decisions, and is thus

137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
64. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
65. See id.
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necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.66 The analysis,
for purposes of insider trading violations, gets complicated, as was
the case in Newman and the Martoma cases, when MNPI enters
the picture, especially for traders who extract profits or avoid losses
for their firms based on the information.
Sorting out who is engaging in insider trading and who is not
is a challenge because, depending on the governing rules, all or
some of the involved persons may be caught in the government’s
enforcement net. Moreover, broad application of insider trading
law, or at least the threat of it, can chill legitimate market
communications. Equally important is that members of the
securities industry need to order their professional lives around the
rules that govern insider trading and face the consequences if they
violate them. Understanding the rules is of paramount importance,
or at least should be.
On the opposite side of the equation is the SEC. The SEC
would agree that “certainty” surrounding insider trading law is a
good thing, and it even encourages the free flow of information to
the market. The SEC and many securities professionals diverge on
whether insider trading law should be narrow or broad. Certainly,
the two views are divergent, and the outcome is important to each
stakeholder. Tellingly, in Dirks, the Supreme Court granted a writ
of certiorari to address the issue of tippee liability because of its
“importance to the SEC and to the securities industry.”67
II. THE DUTY OF TRUST AND CONFIDENTIALITY (DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY) AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S “EXCEPTION”

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the heart of any
insider trading case, including tippee insider trading, is a breach of
the duty of confidentiality.68 In other words, the duty arises from
the fiduciary relationship between the insider and the corporation,
its shareholders, and others.69 This is an extrapolation of the
common law of fiduciary duty. The breach of the duty of
confidentiality is the fraudulent conduct that triggers a section
66. See id. at 658.
67. Id. at 652.
68. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC
Docket 907, 912 (Nov. 8, 1961); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 227 (1996).
69. See Cady, Roberts, 40 SEC Docket at 911.
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10(b)/rule 10b-5 violation.70
By requiring a duty of confidentiality as a prerequisite to an
insider trading violation, the Supreme Court imposed a limitation
on what constitutes insider trading.71 Without this limit, section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 could be interpreted in the extreme resulting
in a violation for any trading of MNPI. For example, if a passerby
finds a confidential memorandum concerning a merger that fell out
of a CEO’s brief case, she is free to trade on it. She has no duty to
the corporation; she has committed no fraud. If a thief breaks into
an office building, steals the same information and trades on it, he
breaches no duty to the corporation and is thus free to trade on the
information, although he is certainly guilty of theft. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has held that there is no general duty between
participants in market transactions to forego actions based on
MNPI.72
Interestingly, in SEC v. Dorozhko, the Second Circuit
sanctioned the application of insider trading law in the context of
cybercrimes and computer hacking, in the absence of a duty of
confidentiality that involved a “misrepresentation.”73 The hackers
traded on an earnings report that they accessed from the issuer’s
computer system before the report was made public.74 The district
court rejected the defense’s argument that the SEC needed to prove
a breach of the duty of confidentially, stating that “[t]o eliminate
the fiduciary duty requirement now would be to undo decades of
Supreme Court precedent, and rewrite the law as it has been
developed.”75 The Second Circuit accepted the argument on appeal
and sent the case back to the trial court for further consideration
based on its ruling.76 In short, the court reasoned that if the
70. See id.
71. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (“[N]ot every instance of financial unfairness
constitutes fraudulent activity under section 10(b) ....... ”); see also Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1983).
72. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
73. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). For an excellent
discussion of this interesting case, which I drew on for this Article, see Brittney
Pagliarini, Inside-Out: The Erosion and Evolution of the Fiduciary Duty
Principle in Insider Trading Cases (May 2017) (unpublished student paper,
Roger Williams Univ.) (on file with the author).
74. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
75. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated,
574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
76. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48.
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defendant’s conduct involved gaining access to the corporation’s
computer system through affirmative misrepresentation of one’s
identity, as opposed to discovering weaknesses in the computer
software, that constituted a deceptive or fraudulent practice under
section 10(b).77 As such, the conduct was actionable as insider
trading because the MNPI was the basis for the subsequent
trading.78 The court’s decision is notable because it did not mention
rule 10b-5, and instead analogized a violation of section 10(b) to
common law fraud to support its holding.79 Frankly, the case
appears to be more of a misrepresentation case than an insider
trading case, which makes it all the more more confusing.
One way to view Dorozhko is that it created a fourth judicial
theory for insider trading—the “affirmative misappropriation
theory.”80 However, the case was widely criticized,81 and has not
gained any traction outside the Circuit.82 The most notable aspect
of the decision for purposes of this Article is that while the court’s
reasoning is defensible on its own terms, the Second Circuit
appears to have gone “out of its way” to accommodate the SEC’s
expansive view of insider trading, which decidedly was not the case
in Newman, but certainly was in the Martoma cases.83 In this
broad sense, it appears that the Martoma cases are more consistent
with the Second Circuit’s general view of insider trading law than
Newman.84
77. Id. at 49.
78. See id. at 51.
79. Id. at 46.
80. See generally Ryan Gilinson, Clicks and Tricks: How Computer
Hackers Avoid 10b-5 Liability, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1305, 1308–09 (2017).
81. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Second Circuit’s Egregious Decision
in SEC v. Dorozhko, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 29, 2009),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/07/thesecond-circuits-recent-decision-in-sec-v-dorozhko-available-here-dealt-withone-of-the-questions-left-open-by-the.html
[https://perma.cc/6D9R-WWM4].
Professor Bainbridge faults the Second Circuit for “finessing” the insider
trading rules by treating the case as one of misrepresentation rather than
insider trading. Id. He has a point.
82. James A. Jones II, Outsider Hacking and Insider Trading: The
Expansion of Liability Absent a Fiduciary Duty, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS
111, 119–21 (2010).
83. See Martoma I, 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d
Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d. 438 (2d Cir. 2014),
abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
84. See Martoma I, 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d
Cir. 2017); see also Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman
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As discussed, insider trading analysis becomes more
complicated when an insider tipper intentionally shares MNPI with
another person, the tippee, who trades on it, or passes it on to
another person who trades on it (remote tippee).85 If an essential
element of insider trading is a breach of confidentiality then, absent
a duty, the tippee is free to trade on the information because he or
she has no duty to the corporation or its shareholders. There is no
fraud. Clearly, the tippee has an unfair advantage compared to
investors who do not have the information. However, unfairness in
and of itself is not fraud, irrespective of how egregious it might be.
If unfairness were the touchstone of a section 10(b)/rule 10b-5
violation, then capital formation in the United States would be
seriously impaired. Here is where Dirks enters the picture with its
“exportation” of the insider’s duty of confidentiality to the tippee.
III. DEFINING TIPPEE LIABILITY: DIRKS, TO NEWMAN, TO SALMAN

A. Dirks: The Personal Benefit Rule Emerges
The Dirks Court sought to address the duty gap in the context
of tippee liability and provide clarity and guidance, especially in the
context of security industry practices. In the process, the Court
made it clear that trading on MNPI, without more, was not illegal,
which was consistent with prior pronouncements.86 Moreover,
Justice Louis Powell, writing for the majority, sought to establish a
rule that did not unduly infringe on legitimate practices in the
securities industry.87
The defendant in Dirks was an officer of a brokerage firm that
specialized in providing investment advice to institutional investors
concerning insurance company securities.88 A former officer of a
public insurance company provided Dirks with information
concerning fraudulent practices by the company.89 The former
insider urged Dirks to investigate the fraudulent conduct that led
to massive misrepresentation of the company’s assets and expose

v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
85. Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 1–5.
86. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
87. Id. at 658.
88. Id. at 648.
89. Id. at 648–49.
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the fraud publicly, which he did.90 Neither the former insider nor
Dirks traded on the information, but Dirks discussed it with a
number of his clients and investors. Some of those clients and
investors traded on the information, thus avoiding losses that
ensued once the fraudulent information became public and the
company’s share price dropped precipitously.91 The SEC’s theory
of the case was that once Dirks received the MNPI, he had an
obligation not to disclose it to the investment community who later
sold their stock, regardless of his motivation or occupation.92 The
SEC was arguing for a “parity of information” standard.93 In other
words, the focus should be on anyone who trades or tips, not the
tipper.94
In a civil prosecution, Dirks was censured by the SEC after an
administrative law court found him guilty of aiding and abetting
illegal insider trading and in violation of section 10(b)/rule 10b-5.95
The case eventually made its way to the United States Supreme
Court.96 In a six to three decision, the Court reversed the court of
appeals, holding that the insider did not violate his duty to the
corporation because he received no monetary or personal benefit
from revealing the information, and the disclosure was not intended
as a gift.97 In the absence of a breach of duty by the insider, there
was no “derivative” breach by Dirks.98
Central to the Court’s reasoning was that the tippee assumes
the insider’s duty of confidentiality by participating in the breach;
in other words, by participating in the fraudulent scheme. For the
tippee, the duty is derivative of the insider’s duty. Hence, the fraud
is necessary to trigger section 10(b)/rule 10b-5-1. In a footnote, the
90. Id. at 649.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 651.
93. Jon Eisenberg, How United States v. Newman Changes the Law, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG.: BLOGROLL (May 3, 2015),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/03/how-united-states-v-newmanchanges-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/QLR9-6BFE]. Eisenberg’s discussion of
Dirks and Newman is very insightful and was relied on heavily for this Article
in this regard.
94. Id.
95. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 459 U.S.
1014 (Nov. 15, 1982) (No. 82-276).
96. Id.
97. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 646 (1983).
98. Id. at 667.
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majority acknowledged the important role that Dirks played in
bringing important information to investors that they otherwise
might not have received.99 Dirks’ efforts where analogized to the
role market analysts play in communicating important information
to the market. In the eyes of Justice Powell, Dirks was merely doing
what any good analyst would do.100 Hence, the need to confine
tippee liability law to protect market analysts and other securities
professionals who are involved in the exchange of information from
judicial over reach.
The Court established a two-prong requirement for which a
jury could infer an insider trading violation when tippers and
tippees were involved.101 The tipper must have derived a direct or
indirect personal benefit from the divulged information and, the
Court explained, in dicta, the tippee must have had knowledge of
the personal benefit associated with the exchange of the
information.102 The Newman court would run with both of these
requirements.
It is the personal benefit rule in the gift-giving context among
friends that stands at the center of Newman and the Martoma
cases. In Dirks, the central focus was on the benefit received by the
insider tipper, not whether the tippee received a benefit. This is a
critical distinction because Newman fully embraced this principle
whereas the courts in the Martoma cases focused on the benefit to
the tippee, which entails a lesser evidentiary standard.103
In Dirks, the Court expressly identified personal benefits to
include a relationship that suggests a quid pro quo arrangement,
financial or otherwise, between the tipper and tippee, or a gift of
MNPI to a trading relative or friend, where the tip and trade
resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of
proceeds to the recipient.104 Interestingly, the Court did not
discuss how clear the relationship needed to be, although arguably
the tenor of the decision pointed in this direction.
99. Id. at 652 n.8.
100. Id. at 658–59.
101. Id. at 665.
102. Id. at 662.
103. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Newman,
773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S.
Ct. 420 (2016).
104. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
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By providing the government with alternative bases to
prosecute tippee liability cases, Dirks hardly foreclosed government
prosecutions. For example, proving a quid pro quo arrangement,
which is arguably the most visible and pernicious form of insider
trading, is relatively straightforward: Did the tipper receive money
from the tippee in exchange for the MNPI? However, proving
personal benefit in the gift-giving context is more difficult because
it involves ambiguous fact patterns.
In introducing the personal benefit rule in Dirks, the Court
sought a “guiding principle” for those market participants whose
daily activities were limited and instructed by the SEC’s insider
trading rules.105 The Court characterized the rule adopted by the
SEC as having “no limiting principle.”106 The Court went on to note
that the question of whether an insider personally benefited from
disclosure would be based on “objective criteria,” rather than
reading the parties’ minds to justify an inference that the insider
received a personal benefit.107 The court in Newman interpreted
this to require evidence of a “meaningfully close personal
relationship.”108
In short, the Dirks Court erected a limiting principle in an
attempt to mitigate against the inherent ambiguity and subjectivity
surrounding the determination of what constitutes a personal
benefit, not to mention other elements associated with proving
illegal insider trading.109 This “limiting principle” of Dirks figures
prominently in Newman and Martoma II, although the Second
Circuit had opposing views on the matter.
The Court’s concern that insider trading law could sweep too
broadly to ensnare or deter market professionals who were
performing an important market function is understandable. In
this sense, Dirks was all about “policing insiders and what they
do . . . rather than policing information per se and its possession . . .
.”110 At the same time, the Court recognized that there was a clear
need for a ban on some tippee trading.111 In effect, by establishing
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 663.
108. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated
by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
109. Eisenberg, supra note 93.
110. Id.
111. Dirks, 473 U.S. at 659.
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the personal benefit rule, the Court sought to thread the needle by
better defining tippee liability, while containing it at the same time.
B. Newman’s Gloss on the Personal Benefit Rule
For many years Dirks was considered settled law. Starting in
2008, the SEC and the DOJ stepped up prosecutions of insider
trading cases.112 As discussed previously, the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York had a string of
eighty successful convictions.113 Simultaneously, the government
was aggressively investigating several hedge funds suspected of
insider trading, with increased focus on remote tippees; that is,
tippees that were one or more levels removed from the original
tipper-tippee.114 Then came Newman, and the personal benefit
landscape changed dramatically.
Newman involved the criminal conviction of two portfolio
managers, Newman and Chiasson, who traded on inside
information passed on by market professionals who received the
information from two corporate insiders.115 The prosecution was
complicated because the defendants were “remote” tippees.116 The
players in this saga were characterized by the court as
“acquaintances.”117 There was no evidence of any pecuniary or
similar gain associated with the original exchange of the
information by the corporate insiders, or that the defendants knew
who originally shared the information, let alone whether it was for
a personal benefit.118
The government argued that it was required to prove that the
defendants traded on MNPI that they knew insiders disclosed in a
breach of a duty of confidentiality.119 This is how the government
read Dirks. The jury instructions essentially mirrored the
government’s position and the defendants were convicted on this
basis.120
112. Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 3.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Raymond, supra note 41.
116. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated
by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
117. Id. at 448.
118. Id. at 453.
119. Id. at 453.
120. Id. at 445–46.
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On appeal, the Newman court reversed the convictions.121
Relying heavily on its understanding of Dirks’ limiting principle, it
found the jury instructions wanting and held that, under the
personal benefit rule, for a factfinder to infer a benefit in the context
of gift-giving, there must be proof of a “meaningfully close personal
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective,
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”122 The court held that
there was insufficient evidence in this regard, and reversed the
convictions on this basis as well as another, which is discussed
below.123
In short, the court concluded that the government could not
satisfy the personal benefit requirement of Dirks by producing
evidence of a mere “casual or social nature.”124 The court also
rejected the idea that mere gift-giving would be sufficient for a jury
to infer a personal benefit.125 It is important to understand that
central to the court’s holding was that, in its mind, the government
was advancing a novel view of insider trading law that sought to
reach remote tippees, which the court considered contrary to
Dirks.126 In this regard, the court noted that in prior cases, tippees
that were as remote as Newman and Chiasson had never been
criminally liable for insider trading.127
Interestingly, the gloss Newman put on the Dirks personal
benefit rule was not the main holding of the case.128 Specifically,
Dirks’ knowledge of the personal benefit requirement was the main
focus of the appellants’ argument.129 A reading of the portion of the
opinion that addresses this issue hardly presages where the court
finally came out. Somewhat of an exaggeration, but the pecuniary
relationship or similar nature requirement appeared largely out of
nowhere. It certainly was not mentioned in Dirks.
In any event, the court also reversed echoing Dirks on the
121. Id. at 444.
122. Id. at 452.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 448.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 452.
129. Telephone Interview with Gregory Morvillo, Partner, Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe (Sept. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Morvillo Interview].
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ground that there was insufficient evidence that the defendants
knew that the original tippers received a personal benefit.130 The
appellants argued that the jury must find that they knew that the
MNPI had been disclosed for a personal benefit.131 The court,
expanding on the dicta in Dirks, agreed with the appellants and
spent a considerable amount of time discussing the issue.132 The
subsequent case law discussed in this Article leaves this leg of
Newman untouched, and thus there is no virtue in further delving
into the court’s thinking there, other than to point out that the
Dirks knowledge requirement, which was elaborated on in
Newman, remains very much alive in the Second Circuit—at least
for now.
Newman was controversial for at least two reasons. The
phrase “meaningfully close personal relationship” does not appear
in Dirks, and according to the majority in Martoma II, the phrase
was “new to our insider trading jurisprudence.”133 In fairness to
the Newman court, Dirks arguably allowed for such an
extrapolation by requiring “objective” evidence to support the
personal benefit inquiry. The Newman court merely defined more
concretely what the government needed to prove to establish the
friend relationship.
More problematic from a doctrinal perspective, the Newman
court went well beyond Dirks by requiring the government to prove
that the tipper received something of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature from the exchange of information.134 A fair reading
of Dirks is that a gift may include something of monetary or similar
nature, but this is not the only indicia of what constitutes a gift—
let alone what constitutes a personal benefit. As discussed, Dirks
provided the government with alternatives to prove personal
benefit.135 In the gift-giving context, Newman took away one of
those options by imposing the pecuniary or of similar nature
requirement.136 More importantly, Newman was susceptible to
being viewed as an inflexible rule that created the potential of
130. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442.
131. Id. at 444.
132. Id. at 444, 447–50, 454.
133. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 77 (2d Cir. 2017).
134. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
135. Id. at 444.
136. Id. at 452–53.
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letting “garden variety” tippee insider trading slip through the
enforcement net.137 This would be on the majority’s mind very
much in the Martoma cases.
Why the court felt compelled to go beyond the language of Dirks
on the personal benefit rule is a fair question. Intellectual
underpinnings aside, the decision was jarring especially because of
the Second Circuit’s long history of accepting the government’s view
of insider trading. Dorozhko certainly underscores this point.138 In
that case, the high standard of proof necessary to sustain a criminal
conviction—not to mention the severe consequences of a
conviction—were clearly on the court’s mind. In this regard, two
commentators noted, “it is more likely the Newman court was
influenced by its view that the government’s efforts to prosecute
remote tippees was a ‘doctrinal novelty,’” and as a result construed
the friends-relative inference narrowly.139 In a similar vein, as one
admirer of Newman has put it, the court sought to establish
“brighter lines to cabin prosecutorial and SEC discretion in
bringing future criminal and civil insider trading actions.”140 The
same can probably be said for the strengthening of Dirks’
knowledge requirement. Simply put, the court concluded that the
government went too far with its view of tippee liability.
The Newman court’s opinion reveals its sensibility to the
impact of tippee liability on the securities industry. The opinion’s
gloss over the personal benefit rule acknowledges, at least
implicitly, that the mere filing of an insider trading case puts
defendants at great financial risk, irrespective of the outcome once
the law is applied. Moreover, the specter of enforcement actions
can have a chilling effect on the flow of important information
concerning issuers that is critical to the securities market and the
lifeblood of the securities industry.141
In sum, Newman created a narrow two-part requirement for
establishing personal benefit in the context of gift-giving between
friends, which made the government’s evidentiary burden much
greater, even in cases that did not involve remote tippees.142 The
137. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 77; Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 5.
138. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2009).
139. Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 5.
140. Eisenberg, supra note 93.
141. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 449.
142. Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 4.
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Martoma cases would prove to be just such a case. Going back to
the critical stakeholder analysis, the securities industry received a
narrow legal rule in the area of tippee liability.
Not surprisingly, the government did not receive the decision
favorably,143 and as the Martoma cases revealed, it was unpopular
within the Second Circuit.144 The SEC characterized the decision
as greatly limiting its ability to prosecute “the most common,
culpable, and market-threatening forms of insider trading.”145
Perhaps something of an exaggeration, but the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York dropped seven
insider trading charges because of Newman and threatened to move
prosecutions outside the Second Circuit.146
The government’s petition for its rehearing and, eventually, its
writ of certiorari, were denied.147 The writ was most likely denied
because there was no clear circuit split on the requirements for
establishing a personal benefit. This would soon change, however.
C. Salman: Newman’s Pecuniary or Similar Value Requirement
Eliminated
In United States v. Salman, the Ninth Circuit was faced with
an appeal of a tippee insider trading conviction based on Newman’s
“meaningfully close personal relationship” gloss on the personal
benefit rule.148
Salman traded while he was in possession of MNPI that he

143. See, e.g., Silvia Stockman, United States v. Newman: The Second
Circuit Establishes New Limits on Insider Trading Prosecutions, 34 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 427, 432–33 (2015); but see Eisenberg, supra note 93.
Doctrinal analysis aside, the difference in views concerning Newman
ultimately comes down to whether one thinks the inquiry into tippee liability
should be broad or narrow. See Stockman, supra, at 433, for a discussion of
how Newman was applied in and outside the Second Circuit. I can say, from
personal experience, it was not followed by the United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island. See also SEC v. Andrade, 157 F. Supp. 3d 124,
127–28 (D. R.I. 2016).
144. See generally Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017).
145. Eisenberg, supra note 93.
146. See Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 9 n.xxxv.
147. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d. 438 (2d Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc
denied, 2015 WL 1954058 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2015), and cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
242 (2015).
148. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015).
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obtained from an investment banker.149 The tipper investment
banker shared the information with his brother-in-law who not only
traded on it, but also shared it with his friend, Salman, who also
happened to be the tipper’s brother-in-law.150 Unlike in Newman,
the evidence produced at trial revealed that the tipper and tippee
had a “very close” friend-relative relationship.151 As such, Salman
had a weak defense under Dirks. The MNPI was a gift to a trading
relative who clearly knew that the tipper received a personal
benefit from the exchange of MNPI.152 For this reason (and others),
Salman was convicted.153
Newman was decided while Salman’s appeal from his
conviction was pending before the Ninth Circuit, and he relied on
that case to provide a basis for reversal. He essentially argued that
the tipper did not receive a pecuniary gain or something of similar
value from the exchange of the MNPI; hence there was no personal
benefit.154 In other words, merely giving of gift of MNPI to a
trading relative or friend was not enough to support an inference of
personal benefit.
Interestingly, Judge Jed Saul Rakoff, a Senior United States
District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, was
sitting by designation on the Ninth Circuit. He was assigned the
opinion in Salman. Judge Rakoff, writing for a unanimous court,
concluded that Dirks allowed the jury to infer that the tipper
breached a duty because he made “a gift of [MNPI] to a trading
relative.”155 To the extent that Newman went further and required
additional gain to the tipper in cases involving gifts of MNPI to
family and friends, the Ninth Circuit “decline[d] to follow it.”156
Central to the court’s holding was its concern that a loophole would
be created if tips were lawful simply because the tipper did not ask
for “tangible compensation in return.”157
The Supreme Court was now faced with a clear conflict
between two important Circuits, which paved the way for Salman
149. Id. at 1089.
150. Id. at 1089, 1094.
151. Id. at 1090.
152. Id. at 1092.
153. Id. at 1094.
154. Id. at 1093.
155. Id. at 1092.
156. Id. at 1093.
157. Id. at 1094.
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to make it to the Court. As previously mentioned, the Supreme
Court had not taken up an insider trading case in almost twenty
years.158 In a narrow decision, the Court, relying heavily on Dirks,
unanimously affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.159 Tellingly,
the Court concluded that the case was “easily” decided by Dirks.160
The Court reasoned that giving a gift of trading information is
the same as the tipper trading and then gifting the proceeds.161
However, the Court rejected the SEC’s expansive view that a gift of
MNPI to anyone, not just a trading relative or friend, is enough to
prove securities fraud.162 This is important because it reveals the
Court’s reluctance to take an expansive view of insider trading
simply because it is unfair, which the Court made explicit.163
Similarly, the Court did not seem impressed with the government’s
argument that “Salman’s concerns about unlimited and
indeterminate liability for remote tippees [was] significantly
alleviated by other statutory elements that prosecutors must
satisfy to convict a tippee for insider trading.”164 The majority in
Martoma II, however, would be more receptive to the government’s
argument.165
The Salman opinion reflects a recognition that limits need to
be placed on insider trading law as it applies to tippees lest it sweep
too broadly by not providing reasonably clear guidelines. To this
point, the Court stated that Dirks provided a “simple and clear
‘guiding principle’” for determining tippee liability in the context of
gift-giving to close friends and relatives that was neither uncertain
nor indeterminate.166 As such, the Court was wholly consistent
with the underlying limiting principle in Dirks. In this regard, the
Salman Court concluded that under the facts of the case at bar, that

158. Ben Protess & Matthew Goldstein, What is a ‘Personal Benefit” from
Insider Trading? Justices Hear Arguments, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/business/dealbook/supreme-courtinsider-trading.html [https://perma.cc/R2TE-EG8R].
159. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 427–28.
162. Id. at 427.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See infra section III.A and III.B.
166. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428.
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principle was not weakened.167 Stated another way, the securities
industry had clear guidelines for at least this aspect of insider
trading. The Court rejected only one of the requirements for
establishing personal benefit under Newman: the “pecuniary or of
similarly valuable nature” requirement.168
Although the Court rejected part of Newman, it left intact the
need for a “meaningfully close personal relationship” to form the
basis for an objective inquiry as to what constitutes personal
benefit.169 The Court did not address the issue because it was not
argued and, in any event, under any definition of the term, the
tipper-tippee relationship before the Court was a close one, and it
was discussed at some length.170 Also, the Court did not disturb
Newman’s gloss on the knowledge requirement, as it was not before
the Court.
D. United States v. Martoma: The Second Circuit’s Attempts to
Clarify the Personal Benefit Rule
1.

Martoma I171

The Salman Court did not intend to answer every question on
tippee liability, but it did provide clarity concerning one aspect of
the personal benefit rule. Truth be known, the pecuniary or similar
value requirement of Newman was not supported by the language
of Dirks, and its demise was not surprising. In Martoma I, the
Second Circuit concluded that further clarification of the personal
benefit rule was necessary.172 In the process, the court drastically
altered what was left of Newman relative to the personal benefit
rule.
To remain chronologically organized, Newman came down
after Martoma’s conviction and Salman was decided shortly after
the Martoma I court heard oral argument on Martoma’s appeal.173
While none of this was intentional, it certainly complicated matters.
In Martoma I, Martoma was a senior trader and portfolio
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 425, 427.
170. Id. at 424.
171. Martoma I, 869 F.3d 58, 58 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d
Cir. 2017).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 58, 61; Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 420.
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manager for a major hedge fund, S.A.C. Capital Advisors (SAC),
which—along with its owner and manager, the infamous and highly
successful, Steven Cohen—had been under investigation for insider
trading.174 In 2016, the government “blinked” at filing a criminal
proceeding against Cohen for insider trading, but settled for a
major civil fine and certain industry restrictions.175 This
background provides insight into the importance of the case for the
court and for the government’s unflagging determination to convict
Martoma and other remote tippees who were members of the
securities industry. While the case meant little to the public at
large, it was a big deal for Wall Street.176
Martoma’s conviction stemmed from an insider trading scheme
involving securities of two pharmaceutical companies.177 In short,
he cultivated a relationship with two prominent doctors who were
involved with a clinical trial for an Alzheimer drug that was
developed jointly by two companies.178 The doctors passed on
publicly unavailable information to Martoma about the unfavorable
results of the drug’s testing.179 One of the doctors passed on the
critical information at two separate meetings.180 Armed with this
174. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 61.
175. Reuters, Billionaire Steve Cohen’s Hedge Fund to Pay $135M to Settle
(Dec.
1,
2016),
This
Class
Action
Suit,
FORTUNE
http://fortune.com/2016/12/01/billionaire-steve-cohen-hedge-fund-135-millionsettlement-class-action-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/L7XA-KDVK].
176. See Walter Pavlo, Prosecuting Insider Trading Cases Just Got Easier:
The
Martoma
Decision,
FORBES (Sept.
6,
2017,
7:04
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2017/09/06/prosecuting-insidertrading-cases-just-got-easier-the-martoma-decision/#4822780b1bf0
[https://perma.cc/HE39-V4FW].
177. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 61. This was not Matthew Martoma’s first
foray into illicit activity. In 1999, he was expelled from Harvard Law School
for creating false transcripts while applying for clerkships with federal judges.
See Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, Ex-SAC Trader Was Expelled
from Harvard Law School, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014, 1:06 PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/09/ex-sac-trader-was-expelled-fromharvard-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/TR4A-FFVU]. Years later, Martoma
was also stripped of his MBA from Stanford University after the school
discovered that he was admitted under false pretenses. See Steven Perlberg,
Former SAC Trader Mathew Martoma Just Lost His Stanford MBA, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2014, 2:11 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/mathewmartoma-loses-stanford-mba-2014-3 [https://perma.cc/4BZN-CJC3].
178. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 61.
179. Id. at 62.
180. Id.
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information, the hedge fund reduced its positions in the two
companies, and entered into short sales and other measures that
would be highly profitable when the companies’ share prices fell.
Not surprisingly, the companies’ share prices fell when the results
of the drug trial were announced.181 SAC obtained approximately
$283 million in avoided losses and profits.182 Martoma received a
$9 million bonus in large part for his efforts.183 Because Newman
had yet to be decided, the jury instructions took an expansive view
of what the government needed to prove to establish personal
benefit, and they did not mention the “meaningfully close personal
relationship” requirement.184
Martoma challenged the sufficiency of the jury instructions and
the evidence. In short, he argued that his conviction should be
reversed under Newman because Salman did not overrule
Newman’s requirement that a tipper have a “meaningfully close
personal relationship” with a tippee to support the inference that
the tipper received a personal benefit from his gift of inside
information.185 In support of his contention, Martoma argued that
he had a casual relationship with the doctor who provided him with
the information.186 He also argued that the doctor was not paid for
the meetings that produced the critical information.187 Martoma
did not advance the tangible value requirement of Newman because
Salman stripped it away.188 Martoma also did not press the
knowledge requirement of Newman, which would have been a weak
argument anyway given that he was not a remote tippee.189
It is important to stop to reflect on what the court faced from
an ad hominem perspective. While tippee insider trading may be
difficult to define, Martoma’s conduct certainly looked like insider
trading by any common sense understanding of the term, and his
conduct was certainly manifestly unfair to other investors who did
not have the information.190 Moreover, it is clear that the court was
181. Id.
182. Id. at 62–63.
183. Id. at 63.
184. Id. at 64–65.
185. Id. at 65.
186. Id. at 64–65.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 65, 68 n.6.
189. See id. at 78 n.11.
190. See id. at 62–63.
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aware of Cohen’s role.191 However, Newman’s “meaningfully close
personal relationship” requirement stood in the way of Martoma’s
conviction absent evidence of a quid pro quo arrangement.192
Equally important, what was left of Newman imperiled the
conviction of “future Martomas.”193 All of this could not have been
lost on the court at some level, and it was certainly not lost on the
government.
Thus, the court was faced with a damning set of facts and had
no statutory guidance as to what constituted tippee insider
trading—other than the requirement that the trading on the MNPI
must involve fraud.194 Dirks was controlling Supreme Court case
law that the court could hardly overrule.195 Still, Dirks left
sufficient room for the court to determine “the appropriate way to
determine when there is a personal benefit in the absence of a
financial benefit.”196
Newman presented a more difficult problem because it was
recent Second Circuit precedent, and it appeared to leave less room
for interpretation than Dirks. Between both the original and
amended decisions, the court crafted a rule that basically nullified
Newman’s relationship requirement. In short, the majority in
Martoma I took a broad approach to the personal benefit rule,
whereas the dissent adhered to the narrow approach in
Newman.197
None of the judges who were on the panels in the Martoma
cases participated in Newman, which probably has more to do with
timing than anything else. Two members of the panel, however,
clearly were not enamored with Newman.198 The court affirmed
191. See id.
192. See id. at 68.
193. See Pavlo, supra note 176.
194. See Brad S. Karp, et. al., Divided Second Circuit Panel Overrules Prior
Newman Insider Trading Decision, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND
FIN. REG. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/07/dividedsecond-circuit-panel-overrules-prior-newman-insider-trading-decision/
[https://perma.cc/CAE2-VUHM].
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 73.
198. See Harry Sandick & Kathryn Austin, Newman’s ‘Meaningfully Close
Personal Relationship’ Requirement No Longer Good Law, BLOOMBERG L.
WHITE COLLAR
CRIME
REP.
(Sept.
29,
2017),
https://www.pbwt.com/content/uploads/2017/10/BNA_Newman%E2%80%99s-
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the convictions over Judge Rosemary S. Pooler’s spirited forty-fourpage dissent.199 In the process, the court did two things. First, it
concluded that based on the “ongoing relationship” between
Martoma and the tipper who provided the critical information, the
jury could infer the essential elements of tippee insider trading,
including a sufficient personal benefit for the tipper, under a
“pecuniary quid pro quo theory” of Dirks.200
Second, and more controversially, the majority acknowledged
that Salman did not explicitly reject the “meaningfully close
personal relationship requirement,” and concluded that Salman
provided a basis for abrogating Newman’s relationship test.201
Specifically, the majority concluded that “the straightforward logic
of the gift-giving analysis in Dirks, strongly reaffirmed in Salman,
is that a corporate insider personally benefits whenever he
‘disclos[es] inside information as a gift . . . with the expectation that
[the recipient] would trade’ on the basis of such information ”202
In the majority’s mind, that was the case “because such a disclosure
is the functional equivalent of [the tipper] trading on the
information himself and giving a cash gift to the recipient.”203 Put
differently, the court stated that giving MNPI to a tippee, with the
expectation that he or she will trade on it, is presumed to be a gift
for purposes of the personal benefit rule.204 Critical to the
majority’s holding was that it applied only to an insider who shares
MNPI with someone who “he expects will trade on the
information.”205 In other words, the majority was not crafting a
rule that deemed gift-giving in every context to be a personal
benefit.
Before going further, it is important to reflect briefly on the
implication of the holding. The Martoma I court replaced
Newman’s narrow rule with a broader rule that swept within its
ambit not only Martoma’s conduct, but also that of Chiasson and
Newman, as well as lesser forms of trading on MNPI, the latter of
%E2%80%98Meaningfully-Close-Personal-Relationship-Requirement-NoLonger-Good-Law_September-29-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXT8-5APC].
199. See id.
200. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 67.
201. Id. at 69.
202. Id. (alterations in original).
203. See id.
204. Id. at 71.
205. Id.
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which arguably would not be captured under Dirks. As such, in a
very subtle way, the majority may have been signaling that Dirks
was no longer relevant.206 The impetus for this may very well be
that the current practices of the securities industry had “out grown”
what the Supreme Court faced in Dirks.207 In other words,
technological advances made the exchange of MNPI between
insiders and market analysts more sophisticated.208
The court’s holding in Martoma I shifted the focus for personal
benefit from the relationship between the tipper and tippee to the
tipper’s intent.209 The majority “closed the deal” by concluding that
Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement
was no longer good law.210 And, according to the majority, this was
all accomplished in accordance with Dirks. In the process, the court
stripped away an important layer of the government’s evidentiary
burden, and instead replaced it with a broad and subjective inquiry
that greatly reduced the government’s evidentiary burden.
In the eyes of Judge Pooler, the “majority’s opinion exactly
mirrors the government’s view pressed in Salman: that ‘a gift of
confidential information to anyone, not just a “trading relative or
friend,” is enough to prove securities fraud.’”211 She went on to
state, “[i]n holding that someone who gives a gift always receives a
personal benefit from doing so, the majority strips the longstanding personal benefit rule of its limiting power.”212
Judge Pooler disagreed with the majority for other important
reasons, but it is fair to trace her ultimate position to her view of
Dirks’ limiting principle, which was not shared by the majority.213
One commentator accurately summarized the thrust of Judge
Pooler’s argument by noting that in the context of the majority’s
holding, “the risk of sweeping in ‘innocent’ conduct is far greater,
and the corresponding need for clear boundaries more acute ”214
Judge Pooler was willing to make a trade-off that the majority was
206. Morvillo Interview, supra note 129.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 69; Sandick & Austin, supra note 198.
210. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 69.
211. Id. at 86–87 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Salman v. United States,
137 S. Ct. 420, 426 (2016)).
212. Id. at 75.
213. Id. at 86–87.
214. Karp et al., supra note 194.
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unwilling to make. In this regard, she implicitly referred to the
very market professionals that the Dirks Court sought to protect
from overreach with the personal benefit rule.
Frankly, getting one’s arm around Dirks and Salman is
infinitely easier than trying to parse through the logic of Martoma
I. The above discussion does not do justice to either opinion. In any
event, Martoma I was remarkable for at least four reasons.
First, the government achieved a result that it was previously
denied of in Newman and Salman.215 This illustrates the
government’s relentlessness in pursuing insider trading in any
form with an expansive view of the law, even after getting “smacked
down” by prior decisions.216
Second, the majority overruled Newman without the benefit of
an en banc hearing, contrary to Second Circuit precedent.217 The
majority acknowledged this but justified its action by stating that a
three-judge panel can overrule circuit precedent “‘where an
intervening Supreme Court decision casts doubt on the prior
ruling.’”218 In other words, the court was merely following the lead
of the Court in Salman, although, as Judge Pooler rightly pointed
out in her dissent—and as the majority implicitly acknowledged on
rehearing—it was too great a stretch to conclude that Salman “cast
doubt” by any reasonable measure on Newman’s relationship
requirement.219
Third, it is not entirely unclear why the majority felt compelled
to go as far as it did, unless it was nothing more than a desire to
take the opportunity to gut a decision that the majority—and
possibly other judges on the Circuit—concluded went too far.220
Arguably, Martoma’s conviction could have been upheld on a quid
pro quo basis in view of the fact that one of the tippers received at
least a $70,000 consulting fee, which formed the basis for the
amended decision, and thus avoided the issue of the “meaningfully
close personal relationship” requirement.221 Additionally, Salman
implicitly left the “meaningfully close personal relationship”
215. See Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 70.
216. See generally id.
217. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 68 (citing Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi
Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 2009)).
218. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 68.
219. Id. at 80 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
220. See Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 5.
221. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2017).
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requirement intact.222 The Supreme Court did not consider the
issue it would have been a significant stretch for the majority to
argue that Salman provided any support for its analysis.
Finally, the Martoma I court dramatically undercut the
limiting principle of Dirks with the subjective intent to benefit
standard, which was more clearly stated in the amended
decision.223 In so doing, the majority ostensibly adhered to Dirks.
In reality, however, the majority arguably casted doubt on the
viability of Dirks.
In sum, Martoma I replaced Newman’s enhanced relationship
requirement with what appeared to be the subjective intent to
benefit standard.224 In doing so, the court effectively removed an
important evidentiary layer of the government’s case. In the
process, the scales were decidedly tipped in the favor of the
government, much to the consternation of the securities industry.
However, the Second Circuit was not done attempting to clarify the
personal benefit rule.
2.

Martoma II225

After the court issued its decision, Martoma successfully
petitioned the court for a rehearing.226 The gravamen of his
argument on rehearing was that the jury’s instructions ran afoul of
Newman by allowing the jury to find that a tipper receives a
personal benefit from gifting inside information even where the
tipper and tippee do not have a “meaningfully close personal
relationship.”227
Here is where things get more curious. The court sustained the
conviction but on different grounds from the original case.
Basically, the court acknowledged that the jury instructions were
inconsistent with Newman, not because they omitted the term
“meaningfully close personal relationship,” but because they
allowed the jury to convict solely on the evidence of a friendship
without requiring a quid pro quo relationship or an intent by the

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 426–27 (2016).
See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 85; see also Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 72–73.
See Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 72–73.
Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 64.
See id.
Id. at 68.
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tipper to benefit the tippee.228 At the same time, the majority made
it clear that there was no need to instruct the jury on the “gift
theory” because the jury could also find a personal benefit based on
the intent to benefit standard.229
Interestingly, the majority opinion is devoid of any reference to
the securities industry, as was the case in Dirks and even Newman.
Moreover, the majority did not trouble itself with analyzing how the
intent to benefit standard was consistent with Dirks’ limiting
principle other than to point out, as it did in the original opinion,
that a prerequisite for personal benefit is that the tipper has an
expectation that the tippee will trade on the MNPI.
The court went on to hold that the error did not affect
Martoma’s substantial rights because the government presented
compelling evidence that at least one tipper shared a relationship,
thus suggesting a quid pro quo with Martoma.230 That relationship
was the $70,000 consulting fee that was paid to one of the doctors,
which was in evidence at the trial and arguably could have ended
the inquiry in the original case.231
The majority focused extensively on the intent to benefit
language contained in its original decision as a means to satisfy the
“meaningfully close relationship” requirement in the gift-giving
context. The majority concluded that its view was consistent with
Dirks, and essentially that “additional evidence of the tippee-tipper
relationship” is not required in every case for a personal benefit to
exist.232
In effect, the Martoma II court reversed its prior ruling that
abrogated Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship”
requirement, and added an alternate basis for establishing
personal benefit based on the intent of the gift-giver, which it found
to be consistent with the Newman requirement and, by implication,
with Dirks.233 In an about face, the majority acknowledged that it
did not need to decide whether Newman’s requirement was
inconsistent with Salman.234
228. Id. at 77–78.
229. Id. at 78.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 68, 78.
232. Id. at 75.
233. See id. at 77–78.
234. Id. at 71.
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In sum, as one commentator succinctly put it, “the majority
read Newman to require evidence of a personal benefit to the tipper,
which can be established through either evidence of a meaningfully
close or quid pro quo relationship between the tipper and tippee or
evidence that the tipper intended to benefit the tippee by sharing
[MNPI].”235 It is hard to imagine any set of facts that could trigger
the application of the “meaningfully close personal relationship”
requirement and yet not be addressed by the lesser intent to benefit
standard. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the majority embraced
Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement
while effectively rendering it meaningless as a practical matter.236
Indeed, Newman was replaced with a test that effectively only
required the government to adduce evidence that MNPI was
intentionally disclosed by a tipper with the expectation that the
tippee would trade on it.237
One can only speculate about the majority’s state of mind from
a tactical perspective. Perhaps the majority was “providing a basis”
for denying an en banc petition by reaffirming Newman’s
relationship requirement and also concluding that even under
Newman, “the personal benefit test is met when a tipper gifts inside
information with the intention to benefit the tippee.”238 Another
entirely plausible but less Machiavellian suggestion is that the
majority did not have a hidden agenda and simply recognized that
they made a mistake in the original decision and wanted to get the
law “right” the second time around, irrespective of the potential for
an en banc hearing. Simply put, the Second Circuit may have been
tired of struggling over the personal benefit rule. In any event, the
en banc petition was denied.
The court’s holding in Martoma II concerning the newly
introduced intent to benefit standard ultimately came down to its

235. Martine Beamon et al., Development in Insider Trading Liability,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (July 25, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/25/development-in-insider-tradingliability/ [https://perma.cc/M43N-VUNE] (emphasis in original).
236. See id.
237. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016).
238. David Miller & Grant MacQueen, Martoma – The Latest Critical
Insider Trading Decision, LAW360 (June 27, 2018, 1:03 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1057759/martoma-the-latest-critical-insidertrading-decision [https://perma.cc/Q4M3-853M].
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textual reading of a single sentence in Dirks.239 There is little value
in relaying the analysis here because it is difficult to parse and the
majority acknowledged that it was ambiguous.240 Suffice it to say,
the majority interpreted the sentence as stating that the intent to
benefit is a stand-alone personal benefit under Dirks.241 According
to the dissent, the correct interpretation of the sentence is that the
intention to benefit requires proof of “a relationship between the
insider and the recipient that suggests . . . an intention to benefit
the particular [tippee].”242
It is not unusual for judges to interpret language differently.
For purposes of this Article, the important point is that the
majority’s interpretation lends itself to an inherently subjective
analysis by the fact finder, whereas the dissent’s interpretation
requires an objective analysis and, by definition, is narrower
because evidence of the requisite close relationship needs to be
established.
The implications of this divergence in views is important for
defendants caught up in the web of insider trading laws. Under the
majority view, the government can establish personal benefit with
evidence of the tipper’s intent, and it is not required to provide
evidence of the tipper-tippee relationship in every case.243 As such,
the majority removed—if not greatly stripped away—the
substantiality provided by Newman’s “meaningfully close personal
relationship” test.244
The dissent’s view pivots off the limiting principle of Dirks.
Judge Pooler stated that “[r]estricting proof of a personal benefit to
objective evidence avoids turning the rule into a mere formality.”245
Like the majority in Dirks, it appears that Judge Pooler was
concerned that insider trading laws could sweep too broadly and
ensnare “legitimate” market participants in its web.246 She was
especially concerned that prosecutors could commence enforcement
proceedings based on scant objective evidence.247 Judge Pooler was
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 74.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 84 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
Id. at 74 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 81 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
See id. at 81–82.
See id. at 82.
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fighting to preserve the heart of Newman, that is, the need to
establish clearer boundaries around government discretion and
prosecution.248
While one can debate who got it right from a doctrinal
perspective, it is clear is that Martoma II essentially replaced
Newman’s objective relationship standard with the subjective
intent to benefit standard.249 In the process, the Martoma’s of the
world were given one less avenue to escape insider trading liability.
However, market analysts and other securities industry
professionals now faced greater prosecutorial risk if they traded on
MNPI that was originally disclosed with the expectation that the
recipient would trade on the information.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF MARTOMA AND NEWMAN

For illustration purposes, the difference between the inquiry
under the Martoma cases and Newman is illustrated by the
following (slightly edited) hypothetical and discussion provided by
Gregory Morvillo, a well-known securities defense lawyer who
represented Newman along with other lawyers.250
Suppose a junior corporate official, who is relatively new to her
job, reveals more about her company than she should, knowing that
the investment professional is going to trade because that is what
investment professionals often do. Morvillo posits that under the
Martoma cases, her conduct could be considered insider trading;
but under Newman, it would not. He goes on to flesh out his
conclusions as follows:
The Martoma cases ask the following: (1) was the disclosure
intentional? (Answer: yes); (2) did the insider have an expectation
the recipient was going to trade? (Answer: yes); (3) could this be
considered a gift? (Answer: yes, because what is a gift but the
intentional giving of information without an expectation of
something in return.) Thus, under the Martoma cases, both parties
could be convicted of insider trading.
Newman asks the following: (1) was the disclosure intentional?
248. See id.
249. See generally id. at 76–78 (majority opinion).
250. Gregory Morvillo, Martoma: The Second Circuit’s Unnecessary Mess,
&
ENFORCEMENT
(Sept.
7,
2017),
NYU: COMPLIANCE
https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/09/07/martoma-the-secondcircuits-unnecessary-mess/ [https://perma.cc/2RBN-KLLZ].
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(Answer: yes); (2) did the insider have an expectation the recipient
was going to trade? (Answer: yes); (3) could this be considered a gift
to a trading relative or friend? (Answer: no, the relationship did
not rise to the level of a “meaningfully close personal relationship,”
because the relationship was not of the nature or kind where one
party would commit fraud and give the other a gift of potentially
millions of dollars. In the real world, that only happens when the
tipper and tippee have a very close relationship.)251
In any event, Morvillo acknowledges that there may be
circumstances where the investor relations person and analyst may
be convicted of insider trading.252 However, his concern, like that
of Judge Pooler, is that Martoma II sweeps too broadly.253 Each
would advocate “close” cases slipping the net of tippee liability,
whereas the majority in Martoma II casted a wider net.
This takes us full circle. The majority was unwilling to let
people like Martoma slip through the narrow net cast by the court
in Newman. Judge Pooler—while she personally may have found
Martoma’s actions abhorrent and certainly unfair—was not willing
to subscribe to a rule that could ensnare securities professionals
that were providing legitimate market services.254
V. SUMMING UP TWO WORLD VIEWS—OR AT LEAST TWO DIFFERENT
APPROACHES

Hypotheticals and textual readings of sentences aside, it is
clear is that the panels in Newman and the Martoma cases took
different approaches to determining where to draw the boundaries
of tippee liability in the gift-giving context—one broad, the other
narrow. What is also clear is that neither the narrow rule of
Newman nor the broad rule of Martoma is satisfactory to both the
government and participants in the securities industry.255 Indeed,
depending on one’s perspective, innocent people may be captured
by a broad rule and wrongdoers may escape under a narrower rule.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 81–82 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
255. See Matt Levine, Everything is Insider Trading Again, BLOOMBERG
OPINION
(Aug.
24,
2017,
12:14
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-08-24/martoma-rulingshows-that-everything-is-insider-trading-again
[https://perma.cc/V4H2YC8Z].
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There does not appear to be any middle ground.
Everyone knows that insider trading is fundamentally unfair,
but defining what constitutes insider trading in the world of
information sharing between providers and recipients in the
securities industry is difficult. Section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 prohibit
fraud, not unfairness per se. The generality of section 10(b)/rule
10b-5 coupled with the lack of clear guidance from Congress
(assuming that is even possible), means that the courts will have to
draw the line. Courts should strive to connect their holdings to
doctrine, and remain cognizant of the fact that serious
consequences will result from where the lines are drawn. The
Second Circuit made three attempts in three years at crafting a
rule, and it struggled in the process.256 While some of the Circuit’s
angst may be attributable to miscalculations on doctrine that
needed correcting, it is arguable that the subject of insider trading
simply does not lend itself to a neat analysis, as it is amorphous and
confusing. Additionally, although the Martoma II majority may
have regarded Dirks as outdated, it was “stuck” with that decision
and had to navigate its way through it as best it could.
The question of who got it right is unanswerable because the
underlying law of insider trading in the context of tippee liability
does not lend itself to a neat analytical framework. It is fair to
argue that the majority and the dissent in Martoma II were both
right and wrong. There is no “one size fits all” answer, which
lawyers and academics have pursued since time immemorial.
Stated another way, the only right answer is the answer provided
by the court that issues the final decision. And for now, that is the
Martoma cases.
Boiling down the different views of the majorities and the
dissents in the Martoma cases on the standard of evidence
necessary to infer a personal benefit to whether tippee liability
should be narrow or broad may be too simplistic for many. It would
be gross speculation to conclude, for example, that Judge Pooler
takes a narrow view of insider trading in general. But it is clear
that, based on her dissent in Martoma II, she at least believes it has

256. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 77–78; United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d
1087, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 450
(2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
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its limitations.257 The same can probably be said for the Newman
court. On the other hand, the approach of the majority opinions in
the Martoma cases appear to have taken an approach more
consistent with the Second Circuit’s historically expansive view of
the reach of insider trading law. In this sense, it is fair to argue
that the majority regarded Newman as an outlier in Second Circuit
insider trading jurisprudence, and what remained after Salman
needed to be set aside.
Whether the majority and dissent started with different “world
views” that dictated the outcomes is unclear. What is clear is that,
at a foundational level, the majority and dissenting opinions in the
Martoma cases reflect divergent views—which have drastically
different consequences—as to the reach of insider trading law in
the context of tippee liability.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARTOMA CASES AND OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS

Unless the Supreme Court takes the case up, which appears
especially unlikely because there is no discernable split in the
circuits, Martoma II stands as the law today in the Second Circuit.
Interestingly, in criminal cases, the government can avoid the
personal benefit rule entirely, though it has not used that power
often. Regardless, after the Martoma cases, the government’s
evidentiary burden in gifting cases has been greatly eased and its
prosecutorial discretion widened, which has important
consequences for the securities industry.258 Also, the SEC has the
authority to bring civil insider trading cases in its administrative
law courts, which it has increasingly done since the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act expanded the
257. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 81–84 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
258. See David Chaiken & Paul Monnin, Why Insider Benefit is Irrelevant
to Criminal Insider Trading, LAW360 (May 19, 2017, 1:52 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/923249/why-insider-benefit-is-irrelevant-tocriminal-insider-trading [https://perma.cc/9JMU-UT8M]. The authors make
the point, which they argue is “largely ignored by most practitioners,
academics and the legal press,” that the DOJ may ignore the benefit
requirement by prosecuting under alternative statutes, such as the criminal
securities fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1348, rather than “per tradition,” under
section 10(b)/rule 10b-5. Id. I have taken the liberty of interpreting the “per
tradition” phrase to mean the government does often resort to these statutes
for insider trading per se.

2019]

TIPPEE LIABLITY

43

universe of defendants that may be sued in administrative
proceedings, and the available remedies.259
What we do know is that after the Martoma cases, the
government’s evidentiary burden in gifting cases has been greatly
eased and its prosecutorial discretion widened, which has
important consequences for the securities industry. Salman ended
the tangible value requirement of Newman.260 It is debatable
whether the “meaningfully close personal relationship”
requirement has disappeared entirely by virtue of the Martoma
cases, although Judge Pooler and Martoma’s lawyers appear to
believe it has.261 In any event, the requirement has been
significantly mitigated and, as the majority pointed out, the bar to
prove personal benefit is now relatively low. It will be interesting
to see what courts outside the Second Circuit do with the Martoma
cases, if anything.
Remote tippees can take some solace from the fact that Salman
and the Martoma cases left largely untouched the second
requirement of Newman, which requires the government to
introduce concrete evidence that the tippee knew (or did not avoid
knowing) of the personal benefit.262 At first blush, this appears to
be a fairly heavy burden. This may explain why the United States
Attorney did not indict some of the “remote” tippees in the Collins
case.263 Newman-like remote tippees can take solace from this,
provided that the Second Circuit does not water down the
knowledge requirement in light of the fact that the “meaningfully
close personal relationship” requirement has been essentially
jettisoned. But that remains to be seen. Indeed, based on the
government’s track record in insider trading cases, it will likely
attempt to chip away at Newman’s knowledge requirement in
future cases.
While Newman, Salman, and the Martoma cases involved
criminal prosecutions, the doctrine that has emerged from these
cases applies equally to civil proceedings, especially with the
259. Gideon Mark, SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings, 19 PA. J.
CONST. L. 45, 46 (2016).
260. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 438 (2016).
261. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 76.
262. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452–53 (2d Cir.
2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
263. See Feuer & Golmacher, supra note 32.
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different burden of proof, which presents an interesting question
that will be left to others to explore further.264 All indications are,
however, that the doctrine applies to civil cases.265 While the
Agency might dispute it, it has a decided “home court advantage”
in terms of the legal basis for tippee liability, which only increased
by virtue of the Martoma cases.
Finally, there is an obvious lesson to be learned here for
participants in the securities industry. The Martoma cases greatly
increased the risks for participants who trade on MNPI. Firms and
individuals who chose to place their faith in the government and
the courts to protect them from insider trading prosecutions may
find themselves sadly disappointed. Compliance programs that are
aimed at detecting and preventing securities law violations will
certainly need to be adjusted for insiders and recipients of MNPI in
order to account for the broad tippee liability standard established
in the Martoma cases.266
The guidance to insiders is fairly straightforward: do not
communicate MPNI to anyone outside the company, especially if
the insider is deriving some personal benefit from the
communication, such as providing a Christmas gift to the doorman
or the plumber in lieu of payment for services rendered. The
potential liability and costs of such action are too high. In reality,
it is more complicated than this for many market professionals who
thrive on information, especially for traders who will want to know
“exactly” what is legal after the Martoma cases and what is not.
In the author’s experience, when it comes to preventing
violations of federal securities law, well-crafted and enforced
compliance programs are hardly fool proof, but if they are
meaningful, they can help to mitigate penalties directed at firms.
In any event, the financial pressures inherent in the securities
industry remain unaffected by the Martoma cases. The means to
achieve financial reward have been affected, and at least made
riskier. It will be interesting to see whether the Martoma cases
have a material impact on information sharing and trading
practices in the Second Circuit and elsewhere. In any event, insider
trading law for tippers and tippees is now a more dangerous trap
264. Dirks involved a civil prosecution. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 650
(1983).
265. See Eisenberg, supra note 93.
266. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 74.
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for the blind or unwary, as Representative Christopher Collins and
his co-defendants are poignantly aware of now.
CONCLUSION

In Newman and the Martoma cases, the Second Circuit
struggled to define tippee liability, but they dealt with a law that
does not lend itself to the clear drawing of lines. Having said this,
Salman took care of the unnecessary overreach by the Newman
court on the pecuniary/tangible benefit requirement. The Martoma
cases initially overreached by rejecting the “meaningfully close
personal relationship” requirement based on Salman, and then
complicated matters worse by reinstating the relationship
requirement and retaining its intent to benefit standard. Over the
course of three years, the underlying rule within the law of tippee
liability broadened dramatically, which undoubtedly caused great
uncertainty and confusion in the securities industry and the
government.
Further, the Newman court and Judge Pooler approached
tippee insider trading from a narrow perspective, whereas the
majorities in the Martoma cases approached it from a broad
perspective.267 Whether each started from the premise that insider
trading law should be narrowly or broadly construed is largely
beside the point. What is important, however, is where the Second
Circuit ended up, at least for now, and how it struggled to get there.
For now, Martoma’s relaxed subjective standard for
determining personal benefit is the law in the Second Circuit, and
along with that comes a likelihood of more insider trading
prosecutions. Naivety aside, one would think the government
should be cautious about opening the floodgates in light of Dirks’
limiting principle. This does not mean that participants in the
securities industry who are paying attention to the Martoma cases
should not be unnerved. Rather, they should be concerned because
the government has broad discretion over when to bring
enforcement actions, and that power was bolstered by the demise of
Newman’s personal benefit requirements. This is the legacy of the
Martoma cases, irrespective of what one thinks of the decision.

267.

See id.

